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THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING —

A FIRST

TRIMESTER REPORT

One-Third The Way There
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting is
about one-third the way home. After approximately six months of
work, the Commission has finished its first trimester, one which saw
the generation of numerous research projects, lively and free
exchanges among the members of the Commission on any number of
topics, and several presentations to the Commission by outside
experts.

Between now and Summer's end, the Commission will receive and
analyze various third party research projects, as well as internal
research projects, and prepare for major Commission meetings in
September and October.

At those meetings, the Commission will make

final decisions on numerous issues, which in turn will provide the
basis for our staff to prepare an exposure draft of the Commission's
Report.

After approval by the Commission, the exposure draft will be
distributed for public comment after the first of the year.

The

comment period will last ninety days, and we hope to analyze and
react to the comments and publish the Report in final form at the
end of another ninety days.

Commission Objectives

Those who have followed the Commission’s work may recall that
our fundamental charge is to analyze the whys and wherefores of, and
propose solutions to, fraudulent financial reporting —
modest undertaking.

a fairly

Some might ask what realistic chance we have

for making a positive contribution.

After all, the AICPA, FASB,

SEC, Blue Sky Commissioners, hard-nosed prosecutors, honest corpo
rate executives, strong-minded auditors, Congressional committees,
and independent directors have not, individually or in concert, been
able to eliminate fraudulent financial reporting.

Some might even

question whether any rational basis whatsoever exists for optimism
on our part.

Although my views are tinged with caution, I believe we have
reason for optimism.

First, our Commissioners are all practical

people with much experience.

Their many combined years of experi

ence and insights bring together substantial judgment, plus differ
ent perspectives and disciplines.

Second, the Commission is ap

proaching fraudulent financial reporting as a multi-dimensional
problem, based on our belief that many factors contribute and that
the multiple causal influences must be identified and addressed to
provide hope for any degree of success.

Third, we operate under no

illusion that our Report will, once and for all, magically banish
fraudulent financial reporting in its many forms and colorations.
The problem of fraudulent financial reporting does not lend itself
to simple answers —

the activity is as complex as human nature
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itself, with all its quirks, foibles, and eccentricities.

Fourth,

and perhaps the converse of having no illusions of granduer, success
does not require that we solve all the problems.

Rather, success to

a large extent lies in identifying and airing the issues —
causal influences —

the

thereby setting the Stage for further consider

ation of ways to deal with those influences.

With those thoughts firmly in mind —

particularly that fraudu

lent financial reporting must be approached as a multi-dimensional
problem —

let’s explore the Commission’s approach.

Early on, as

the Commission attempted to determine its approach and methodology,
we found ourselves asking a number of questions.
fraudulent financial reporting?
contribute?

What causes

What internal corporate pressures

What individual shortcomings come into play?

What

failings of private corporations and of corporate governance con
tribute?
tial?

What broader societal and economic pressures are influen

What inadequacies of governmental regulations have an impact?

The mere exercise of asking these questions quickly caused the
Commission to conclude the obvious —

that many factors, players and

pressures contribute to fraudulent financial reporting.

If that is

so, then many ways should exist which have potential for reducing
fraudulent financial reporting.

Concentration on only one, or a

few, causes/solutions might be valuable, but "miss the big picture."
Someone has described efforts like ours as handling a big balloon.
If you push too hard on one side, it bulges out on the other.

An

even-handed, even-pressured approach preserves the proper shape.
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The Focus

So where did the Commission focus —
factors, what influences?
ment.

on what players, what

First, the Commission focused on manage

After all, management has both the initial and final respon

sibility for accurate financial statements.

As the Commission

focused on management's role, many questions that quickly emerged
turned out to be corporate governance issues.

The Audit Committee was a predictable focus, and we have spent
much time on that issue.

Questions raised thus far, without any

definitive positions being taken, include:

1.

Should Audit Committees be mandatory for all
publicly-owned corporations? Or for any group of
companies?

2.

Should Audit Committees have greater powers?
what?

3.

Since no source prescribes the powers of the Audit
Committee, should we try to create a list of powers
and responsibilities?

4.

Should the role of Audit Committees be more visible
and better communicated to the public? Would it be a
positive development, for example, if the Chairman of
the Audit Committee included in the Annual Report to
Stockholders his own letter describing the activities
of the Audit Committee?

5.

Should the Audit Committee's interface with the
internal audit department, and its involvement with
and attention to internal controls, be more publi
cized?

If so,

Those are but a few of the corporate governance issues the
Commission has discussed, all relating to the Audit Committee.
I emphasize that the Commission is interested in these —
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But

and all

other —

topics only as they relate to or have potential for reduc

ing fraudulent financial reporting.

We are not embarked on an

effort to overhaul corporate governance generally.

Beyond Audit Committees but still loosely in the corporate
governance arena, the Commission also has looked at corporate
structure, environment, and atmosphere.

You could call it the

corporate culture.

Again, however, I emphasize that our look is

sharply focused —

how does corporate culture relate to, encourage

or tolerate, or discourage or prevent, fraudulent financial report
ing.

In that area, the Commission has considered, e.g.:

1.

Do certain management techniques — such as management by
objective and decentralized operations — lend themselves
to abuses more readily than others?

2.

Should more formalized procedures generally be followed by
everyone involved in the financial reporting process? If
so, what are they?

3.

Rather than attempting to prescribe new procedures, should
the Commission instead focus on other approaches, such as
more required disclosure about internal controls and
procedures?

4.

Should corporate management be required to express an
opinion on the adequacy of internal controls — an idea
once proposed by the SEC but later abandoned?

5.

Is the tone and atmosphere set at the top the most influ
ential factor? If the tone set at the top is fuzzy, are
all other controls and procedures predestined to be
ineffective? Can our Commission influence that tone?

6.

To what extent should the Commission encourage or propose
corporate codes of conduct or ethics?

The Commission has spent much time on internal controls and the
role of the internal auditor.

That focus involves, at least
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potentially, some issues of corporate governance and of corporate
structure and function.

In each meeting, regardless of our agenda,

we seem to come back to internal controls.

Beyond management, the other most visible player in financial
reporting is the independent public accountant —
able focus of the Commission.

When considering the independent

accountant, we find no shortage of issues.
possible decline is one.

a highly predict

Professionalism and its

Beyond the general debate about "profes

sionalism," the Commission has focused upon competition and opinion
shopping, the SEC’s Request For Comments on Opinion Shopping, the
Auditing Standards Board’s decision to tackle the same issue, and
the steady debate about auditors’ ability and obligation to detect
fraud.

The Commission also has focused on the accounting profession's
existing regulatory and enforcement mechanism and proposals for
change, as well as upon public concern about the potential impact of
non-audit services on auditor independence.

But, as I said in

reference to management and corporate governance, and I emphasize
again, our focus on these and all issues is narrow.
relate to fraudulent financial reporting, if at all?

How do they
Would changes

reduce incidents of fraudulent financial reporting or otherwise
lessen the potential for its occurrence?

We are not interested in

these issues as broad policy issues, as interesting as they may be.
Only if we were to determine that some change in the profession’s
self-regulatory structure or in the scope of services provided would
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lessen the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting would we have
any basis for comment.

After management and the auditor, law enforcement may be the
next most significant factor.

The Commission therefore has and will

continue to address the effectiveness of the regulatory and law
enforcement environment in dealing with fraudulent financial report
ing.

Is it good, bad or indifferent?

enforcement environment the real issue?
advance" the answer?

Is the regulatory and law
Is more "regulation in

Can law enforcement realistically do more than

discipline a few truly egregious violators?

Law enforcement considerations inevitably take us to penalties
and sanctions —

a long-running, sometimes highly emotional debate.

In that vein, the Commission has discussed issues such as:

1.

Are sanctions generally adequate?

2.

Is the injunction a stiff sanction or a meaningless wrist
slap?

3.

Are more criminal prosecutions and longer sentences for
white collar crime the answer?

4.

If law enforcement and regulation are to be encouraged,
what about the effectiveness of self-regulatory organiza
tions in the enforcement area? How effective are the
enforcement mechanisms of private professional groups?

5.

How effective are specific regulatory and law enforcement
agencies?
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Do they deter?

Research Projects
From the outset —
approach —

given the Commission’s multi-dimensional

reliance on third-parties for research assistance and

input has been a necessity.

As we receive third-party research

efforts, they will be analyzed, digested, and perhaps refined.
While some of these research efforts may gather information which is
broader than our narrow focus, we intend to confine our Report,
again, to fraudulent financial reporting.

Take any of the areas I

have talked about, corporate governance, for example.

Our Commis

sion has neither the time, capacity, nor inclination to do a compre
hensive study of that issue.

Our focus of necessity must be sharp.

Is there something about corporate governance, some aspect of it,
that relates directly to fraudulent financial reporting?

With those cautionary words about our research efforts, here is
a list of outside research projects.

Impact of Professionalism and Codes of Conduct on Financial
Reporting.
Financial Reporting in the U.S. and the Role of the SEC.
The Independent Auditing Profession’s Response to Fraudulent
Financial Reporting.
How to Introduce the Issue of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
to College Business Students.
Expansion of Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence.
Surprise Write-Offs.
How Internal Controls Can Help In Prevention and Detection of
Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
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Role of the Internal Audit Function in Prevention and Detec
tion of Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures Contributing
to Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Corporate Structure/Governance and Fraudulent Financial
Reporting.
In addition, the Commission's staff will be conducting inter
nal research projects on the following topics.

Analysis of SEC Cases. (A database of approximately 200 cases
has been partially complied and awaits analysis. Analysis
will includes review of prior studies, including work done by
the Cohen Commission? analysis of 200 cases looking for any
patterns and common characteristics? and in-depth analysis of
4-6 cases.)
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures within CPA
Firms. (A study of the forces and pressures generally experi
enced by members of the audit team that may contribute to
breakdowns in audit quality. The purpose is not to reinvent
the Cohen Commission's study on budget pressure, but rather to
gain a broader understanding of the behavioral dynamics that
operate in administration of typical audit engagements. Among
other goals, this study will evaluate SAS No. 22 — Planning
and Supervision.)
Opinion-Shopping and Competition. (This study will analyze
conflicting viewpoints surrounding the practice of opinion
shopping and attempt to relate these findings to the more
general issue of competition in public accounting.)
Reporting on Financial Condition. (This study will explore the
feasibility of the independent auditor's assuming increased
responsibility for evaluating and reporting on going-concern
problems.)
Red Flag Checklist. (This study will compile an inventory of
red flags from existing sources, other work of the Commission,
and risk analysis questionnaires of public accounting firms
and explore how this information can be used to prevent
fraudulent financial reporting.)
Second Partner Reviews. (This study will gather information
about second partner reviews in public accounting firms and
explore the feasibility of standards being established by the
Auditing Standards Board.)
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Self-Regulation of Public Accounting Profession. (This study
will consider the regulatory environment in which public
accountants perform audits and consider alternatives.)
Quality Control Standards. (This study will evaluate the
existing guidance provided by quality control standards.)
Analytical Review/Operational Audit Procedures. (This study
will explore the usefulness of analytical review and opera
tional audit procedure in detecting fraud.)
Fraudulent Financial Reporting Framework. (This study will
evaluate the available literature on white collar crime to the
area of fraudulent financial reporting.)
Fraud Taxonomy. (This study will attempt to classify various
fraudulent acts and refine the concepts and terminology
surrounding fraud.)
Related Studies. (This project will gather information about
similar fraud initiatives going on in other countries.)
Guidelines for Audit Committees. (This study will attempt to
develop guidance as to the role of audit committees.)
Financial Reporting Process. (This study will attempt to
describe the financial reporting process, including its key
components and interrelationships, and explain how the integ
rity of this process is compromised by acts of fraud.,
Legal Environment. (This study will attempt to describe how
the legal system relates to and can impact fraudulent finan
cial reporting.)

Possible Report
If you have followed my meanderings, you have a possible
outline for a Report.

And, in fact, the Commission has tentatively

decided that the Report will have chapters or sections along the
following lines:

1.

Introduction and Goals.

2.

Environmental and Individual Forces and Pressures and
their Implications for Preventing, Discouraging, or
Encouraging Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
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3.

Professionalism.

4.

Effectiveness of Regulatory and Law Enforcement Agencies.

5.

Corporate Structure and Governance.

6.

Independent and Internal Auditing.

7.

Conclusions, Models, Recommendations.

Thus far, I have spoken about the affirmative —
Commission will do and be.
Commission will not be.
things to all men.

what the

Let’s turn to the flip side —

what the

The Commission is not attempting to be all

It will not be a prosecutor of any specific

corporation; an accounting standards setter; a drafter of specific
legislation or regulatory agency rules; an auditing standards
setter, other than perhaps in the most limited fashion; an investi
gator of all business practices that any segment of society finds
objectionable; or a panacea —

the ultimate, self-contained answer

to all financial reporting and disclosure evils.

Conclusion

Any effort such as ours causes those who are involved to
reflect periodically on the conclusion of the project, particularly
that result which others might label a success.

In thinking about

success, I suggest that success -- like the problem of fraudulent
financial reporting —

of necessity is composed of many elements.

They include:
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1.

The Report must contain a balanced analysis and addressing
of the issues.

2.

A second determinant will be whether the Report provides a
basis for other private, public, and professional groups
to go further in certain areas — whether it becomes a
springboard for others to pursue matters in more depth.

3.

Success also will be measured by whether the Commission
raises levels of sensitivity and creates a heightened
awareness among all — corporate management, the account
ing profession, regulatory agencies, and the public —
about the financial reporting process and the particular
elusive problem of fraudulent financial reporting.

4.

Practical guidance will be a major element of success.
For example, can the Commission identify common patterns
among companies that go astray? Can we characterize and
catalogue those patterns? Can the Commission go so far as
to suggest a model which has the maximum potential for
minimizing the incidence of fraudulent financing report
ing?

Thank you for your attention.
*

*

*

*
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